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Temporary and circular migration programs have been devised by many destination 
countries and supported by the European Commission as a policy to reduce welfare 
and social costs of immigration in destination countries. In this paper we present an 
additional  reason  for  proposing  temporary  migration  policies  based  on  the 
characteristics  of  the  foreign  labor-effort  supply.  The  level  of  effort  exerted  by 
migrants, which decreases over their duration in the host country, positively affects 
production, real wages and capital owners' profits. We show that the acceptance of job 
offers  by  migrants  result  in  the  displacement  in  employment  of  national  workers. 
However it increases the workers‟ exertion, decreases prices and thus can counter 
anti-immigrant  voter  sentiment.  Therefore,  the  favorable  sentiment  of  the  capital 
owners and the local population towards migrants may rise when temporary migration 
policies are adopted. 
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Migration  is  a  never-ending  problem  in  modern  society.  The  debate  on  the  best 
immigration policy has been ongoing since the colonial period and grew increasingly 
intense in the last century when the destination countries began to impose controls on 
immigration.  
The core issue in this debate is finding the appropriate policy with which to 
favor a positive effect of immigration, at least in the destination countries. Should 
policies be more open or more restrictive, should they be selective or otherwise? 
There are three main arguments backing this choice:   The first is the effect of 
foreigners on the labor market in the destination country. Are migrants competing 
with natives in the labor market or are they complementary?  Should policies be more 
restrictive or should they be more open? Should the migrants be skilled or unskilled? 
The empirical  literature  from  Europe, the USA, Canada, and  Australia finds little 
evidence of wage competition and employment competition. The debate continues, 
but it is centered on the econometric techniques which enable better measurement of 
the foreign effect and better control for the endogeneity of migration location.
1    The 
second line of reasoning starts after the conclusion of the first.  Even if migrants are 
not  strong  competitors in  the labor market,  they  use the welfare system, in some 
countries more than the natives do. Some authors have even suggested the existence 
of „welfare shopping‟ whereby migrants locate and where the welfare system is more 
generous  (Borias  1999),  but  significant  evidence  of  this  does  not  exist,  with  the 
exception  of  the  findings  by  De  Giorgi  and  Pellizzari  (2006).  In  countries  where 
welfare systems are more generous, especially in Europe, there exists evidence that 
supports a larger use of the foreign population on welfare, i.e. in Germany, the United 
Kingdom and Sweden.
2 This welfare declines if the migrants‟ characteristics are taken 
into account (Barrett and  McCarthy, 2008, Pellizzari, 2011)
3. This result is supported 
                                                 
1 The debate was first dominated by the Borjas (1994)-Filer (1992)-Card (2005) puzzle namely that in a 
cross-spatial analysis the complementary of immigrants may be induced by the internal mobility of 
natives from an increasing migration and declining wage area to a non-increasing immigration area. The 
latter  area  is  contaminated  by  the  former  labor  market  affect  and  conceals  the  negative  impact  of 
immigrants  in  the  first  area.  Then,  to  overcome  this  weakness,  the  debate  shifted  to  the  skill-cell 
approach in a production function model with mixed results by Borjas (2003)-Ottaviano Peri (2006). 
2 See e.g. Castronova et al.  (2001) and Riphan (2004) for Germany, Barrett  and McCarthy (2008) for 
the United Kingdom, and Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) for Sweden. 
3 On general problems of the welfare state, see Hans-Werner Sinn (1995). 3 
 
by the many empirical studies conducted on wage and employment assimilation.
4  The 
third  line  of  argument  stresses  the  difficult  and  limited  social  assimilation  of 
foreigners: even the second generation seems unable to integrate into the social life of 
the destination country. Both the “melting pot” (Glazer and Moynihan 1970) and the 
“bumpy  line”  theories  of  assimilation  (Gans  1979,  1996)  questioned  the  previous 
positive view of the immigrant integration process, and the “segmented assimilation 
paradigm”, developed by Portes and Zou (1993), put an end to them: it interpreted 
social upgrading either as specific and occasional individual action or as an organized 
group activity which is not always successful. These three arguments have given new 
support  for  a  temporary  migration  policy  which  may  solve  the  difficulties  of 
integrating foreigners economically and socially, and possibly reduce to some extent 
their welfare costs and competition in the labor market. 
New  emphasis  has  been  given  within  the  European  Commission
5  to  the 
proposal of circular migration policies. These seemingly re -propose the temporary 
migration policies adopted in North Europe until the oil price increase of 1973 and the 
beginning of the recession, but in fact they represent a new vision of the international 
mobility pattern. Temporary migration will not only solve competition , economic, 
social integration and welfare costs in the destination countries it will also favor the 
economic growth of sending countries by reducing brain drain and contrasting the 
negative effects of remittances, which frequently create a  subsidized economy and 
reduce the labor force participation rate and the future growth path.
6 
In this paper we suggest another reason for pursuing temporary migration. 
This  is  based  on  an  efficient  use  of  human  resources  by  the  employer  and  a 
maximization  of  the  utility  of  consumers.  Whereas  Dustman  and  Weiss  (2007) 
analyze the incentives for migrants to adopt short -stay migration plans, we analyze 
their labor productivity and the implications of the employer‟s maximizing decisions 
and  for  the  consumers  consumption  levels,  which  will  both  be  in  favor  of  short  
stopover. 
On  the  political  economic  side,  studies  on  immigration  policy  investigate 
voters‟  attitudes  to  immigrants  (see  for  example  Mazza  and  van  Winden  1996, 
                                                 
4 See e.g. Dustman and Fabbri (2005) for the United Kingdom and  Venturini and Villosio (2008) for 
Italy. 
5  European  Commission,  “On  Circular  Migration  and  Mobility  Partnerships  between  the  European 
Union and Third Countries”, COM (2007) final, Brussels, 16 May 2007. 
6 See e.g.  Newland  and Agunias (2007). 4 
 
Benhabib 1996, Hillman and Weiss 1999)
7. Such studies require an underlying basis 
which explains why a voter may support or object to immigration.  One basis, which 
identifies  personal  gains  and  losses  from  immigration,  is  the  standard  full -
employment model of international trade and factor movements (see Kai -yiu Wong, 
1995). Alternatively, all members of a local population may benefit when immigration 
reduces the domestic per capita tax burden for the financing of collective goods. Or, 
more generally, there may be benefits for the local population when immigration 
expands the  domestic tax base, and, for example, allows the public financing of 
intergenerational  transfers  that  might  otherwise  be  unsustainable  because  of 
demographic imbalance in the local population (see Lee and Miller 1998, Bonin et al. 
2000,  Storesletten  2000,  H illman  2002).  Epstein  and  Hillman  (2003)  consider 
employed workers who pay taxes, which finance income transfers to the unemployed, 
and find that immigrants initially displace national workers from the unemployment 
pool. The real wage declines because of i mmigration, but the probability of a local 
worker  being  employed  increases.  Although  employed  workers  finance  income 
transfers to the unemployed, immigration , within designated bounds, increases the 
expected utility of local workers. Since employers benefit from immigration, there are 
immigration policies  which are mutually beneficial  to all voters, whether they are 
local employees or employers, although employers will want more immigrants than 
workers.  
In this paper we take a different view by looking at  the effort exerted by 
migrants  during  their stay  or  work  in  the host  country.  We  suggest  a  possible 
interpretation of why migrants, at least  in the initial period in the host country, exert 
more effort than the local population.  When immigrants arrive in  the host country 
they  may  accept  jobs  which  entail  long  hours  of  work.  For  example,  female 
immigrants employed in family services frequently work around the clock. This 
implies that migrants‟ working hours are uncertain and that they enjoy little freedom 
and free time. The longer they stay in  the destination country, the more they are 
reluctant to accept such jobs. They prefer normal hours with leisure time. A similar 
pattern is apparent in other types of service jobs. In addition, migrants in agricultural 
accept long working hours, and may be willing to perform the heaviest tasks in the 
                                                 
7 Epstein and Nitzan (2006) consider the role of interest  groups in the determination  of  migration 
quotas.  5 
 
industrial sector. Not only are they willing to work overtime, but they are also very 
flexible and willing to accept last-minute changes.  The results of our paper have a 
similar flavor to those presented by Galor and Stark (1991).  Their paper builds on the 
idea that migrants consider the possibility of eventually returning to their (low-wage) 
country of origin and thus may have an incentive to work harder in the (high-wage) 
country of destination. Our paper does not consider this incentive. If we would add 
this incentive our results would even be further enhanced.  
We consider an efficiency wage model to analyze the choice of local workers 
and migrants regarding the exertion of effort in the workplace. The level of effort 
affects  the  consumption  patterns  of  both  groups.  When  determining  their  level  of 
consumption, individuals take into account the price of consumption. Upon arrival, 
immigrants evaluate  the weighted average  between the local price level and the price 
level in their home country
8. With time, the  weight of the price level in the home 
country  decreases  and  it  converges  to  the  local  price  level.  Therefore,  the 
consumption patterns and the effort exerted  merge with those of the local population. 
The application of high effort and low consumption patterns has two different 
effects on the local population. Higher effort decreases the employment of the local 
population; however, a decrease in patterns of consumption by migrants increases the 
benefits for the local population.    
Over time, both consumption patterns and the exertion of effort converge  to 
those of the local population. Therefore, the sentiment of capital owners and the local 
population towards migrants  may  change  when temporary migration policies are 
adopted. Under such policies, the temporary migrants will enter the country for a short 
period of time, exert a high level of effort in the workplace, and at the same time 
decrease the cost of consumption for the local population. These temporary migrants 
would leave at the end of the period and be  replaced by new temporary migrants.
9  
In section 2 we present  some evidence on the variables at the  heart of the 
model. The model is described in section 3. The consumption pattern of immigrants is 
                                                 
8 We are assuming that migrants come from countries with lower price levels. We will elaborate on this 
later in the paper. The value applied to the price level in the country of origin and in the host economy 
may  be  endogenous  to  the  migration  strategy  and  expected  consumption  patterns  (temporary, 
permanent, permanent with remittances, etc). We will discuss this later on.  
9 On other benefits and costs of temporary  migration and on optimally creating such  a policy  see 
Epstein, Hillman and Weiss (1999) and Boeri, Hanson and McCormick (2002). For a more general 
analysis of permit and temporary contracts see Venturini 2004 p.208-219.  6 
 
specified in section 4. In section 5 we determine the equilibrium wage and the level of 
effort exerted in the case of homogeneous or heterogeneous human capital with or 
without inelastic supply of immigrants. Section 6 analyzes the implications of the 
efforts supplied  by immigrants on the local labor and products. The paper concludes 
with some policy implications.  
 
2. Puzzling Empirical evidence. 
Our paper is motivated by some stylized facts.  More specifically, research indicates 
two contradictory behaviors: when arriving in the host country migrants have low 
consumption levels and large saving.  With time consumption increases, remittances 
decrease and the savings decrease.  On the other hand, the effort invested by the 
migrant is higher initially and declines as the migrants become more integrated into 
the  destination  economy.    Our  model  tries  to  understand  this  contradictory  by 
considering  the  migrants‟  attitudes  towards  prices  in  both  the  home  and  host 
countries.  
 
2.1 The first one is that in the initial phase of migration foreigners have a very limited 
consumption  in  the  destination  country,  very  large  saving  and  large  amount  of 
remittances which they send back to the origin country. As migration goes on however  
consumption  in  the  destination  country  increases,  remittances  decrease  and  the 
savings become more similar to the natives.   
There is a large amount of empirical evidence which shows that the amount of 
remittances  declines  as  the  migrant  becomes  more  integrated  into  the  country  of 
destination and decreases with family reunification (Funkhouser, 1995, Poirine, 1997, 
Galor and Stark ,1990, Carling, 2008).   The reduction of the remittances, and the 
increase in the consumption in the destination countries, is frequently related to the 
reunification of the family but also to the more general assimilation process, where 
the assimilation in the consumption pattern prevailing in the destination country plays 
an important role.  
De  Voretz  and  Vadean  (2005)  point  out  that  in  Canada  the  migrants‟ 
remittances decline as the duration of residence in the host country increases. There 
are,  however,  differences  among  communities  and  the  migration  policies  play  an 
important  role  because  if  family  reunification  is  allowed  and  favored  from    the 7 
 
commencement  of  the  migration  pattern,  the  amount  of  remittances  sent  back  is 
reduced  and  their  decline  as  well.  The  same  is  found  in  the  Eastern  European 
countries  by  Mansour  and  Quillin  (2006)
  10  and  in  Europe  by  Holst,  Schäfer, 
Schrooten  (2010)  for  women  migrants.  The  evidence,  regarding  the  decline  in 
remittances, is very well  recorded. 
Less  evidence  exists  regarding  consumption  and  saving  behavior  of  the 
migrants in the destination country. The evidence stresses an increasing pattern of  
consumption and a declining one for savings. Kumku (1989) found in Germany a high 
saving rate for Turkish immigrants in their first few years and Kirdar (2009) found 
that the saving rate decreases with age in Germany.  More specifically Bauer and 
Sininng (2005),  using GSOEP, show that in 2001 in Germany the saving rate of 
temporary migrants  was larger than the saving  rate of permanent  migrants  (0.072 
versus 0.050) and the savings plus the remittances rate is higher for the temporary 
migrants than for the permanent ones (0.10 versus 0.066).   In Sinning (2007) using 
the same data, it was established that temporary migrants save on average 16.7% more 
and send 20.6% more other transfers to their home country than permanent migrants. 
Similarly  Piracha  and  Zhu  (2007)  find  that  among  the  migrants  there  are  larger 
savings and remittances relative to the locals and this is interpreted as an insurance 
against an uncertain future.  These savings decline as the integration in the destination 
country become more formalized. 
For  Italy,  Speciale  and  Barigozzi  (2009)  find  that  the  consumption  of 
immigrants with higher permanence in the host country dominates the one with lower 
permanence. Migrants are not different from other consumers and are affected by the 
reference group and by emulating behavior (Maurer and Meier 2008). 
 
2.2 The second empirical evidence is that the effort invested in the work is higher 
initially and declines as the migrants become more integrated into the destination 
economy. 
 
 The idea, that the initial effort of the migrant is bigger, belongs to the general 
perception  of  the  foreign  worker  behavior  (Schaeffer,  1995).      Unfortunately,  the 
information on the individual productivities is very rare. A proxy for this would be the 
                                                 
10 See for instance in the Mediterranean case Venturini (2004) .  8 
 
amount of hours spent at the workplace.  There does exist evidence regarding the 
number of hours worked. Kahanec and Shields (2010), using the GSOEP observe a 
reduction in hours worked as migrant tenure increases. Temporary migrants work on 
average 15 hours per week more than permanent ones. This behavior is reported for 
the USA labor market where Lozano (2010) finds that the probability of a migrant 
working long hours decreases significantly after five years being in the USA. 
Cortes (2004) finds that in the USA refugees, with more permanent migration 
prospects, work 14% less than the more temporary economic migrants.  A preliminary 
research by Reyneri (2011) on the Italian market indicates similar results. Also, in 
Italy total hours worked by migrants decrease after five years by at least 10%, and the 
reduction is even larger for some groups:  Moroccans reduce their contribution to 




These  two  behaviors  seem  contradictory  because  when  migrants  increase 
consumption in the destination country,  where  prices are higher,  we would expect 
an increase in working hours to gain extra money, and a relaxation of  their budget 
constraints,  while instead we observe a reduction in effort and hours worked on the 
job which seem irrational. 
 
With the model below, we provide an interpretation of this puzzling behavior of the 
migrants which is very rational if regarded in term of real wage and the consumption 
basket that the migrant can afford. 
 
3. The model 
Consider a population which consists of owners of capital and workers.  Workers 
consist of NL nationals and NF immigrants.  All workers are risk neutral and averse to 
effort and have the same level of productivity
12. The utility of the workers, U(.), is a 
function of consumption, C: U(C).  As commonly assumed in such cases we assume 
that  U(C)=C.  Consumption  is  time  consuming.   To  simplify,  we  assume  that,  on 
average, each unit of consumption needs one unit of time.   Each worker has a total of 
                                                 
11 Emilio Reyneri, 2011, Preliminary results on the hours worked by migrants, mimeo. 
12 For the sake of our analysis, assuming that the level of productivity of the migrants is lower would 
only enhance our results. 9 
 
T units of time to consume.  However, if a worker exerts effort at the workplace he 
has less time to consume (one could give this many explanations, for example, the 
more  effort  exerted  at  the  workplace  gives  the  worker    less  strength  to  consume 
expend at the end of the day, or the more time/effort spent at the workplace, leaves 
less time for consumption).  Denote the effort exerted at the workplace by e and the 
price of an average unit of consumption equals P.  Therefore, the constraint facing the 
worker that emerges is:    N w e T P   , where wN  is the nominal wage of the worker.  
As the worker's objective is to maximize his utility (consumption) he/she will always 
set the total cost of consumption to equal the wage:    N w e T P   .  If the worker 
exerts minimum amount of effort at the workplace    L e e  then his/her utility will 





e e C U    , , however if the worker  does exert effort at a higher 





e e C U    , .    Namely, 
exerting  effort  decreases  the  consumption  level.    As  the  effort  at  the  workplace 
increases the worker will be able to consume fewer products as a result of the time 
restriction. We therefore obtain, as assumed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Epstein 
and  Hillman  (2003)  and  others,  that  the  utility  is  separable  and  linear  in  private 
consumption which is provided through expenditure of a real wage w (w = wN /P 
where wN is the nominal wage and P is the price level) and in the level of effort e, 
 
        U(w, e) = w – e.              (1) 
 
To simplify we assume that effort is dichotomous, it either equals eL or eH > 0 
13.  We 
always exert effort, whether employed or unemployed. Thus under this assumption e 
= eL is the minimum level of effort exerted by the worker.  An unemployed worker 
receives benefits of wo from the state and exerts the minimal level of effort (e = eL ).   
Welfare payments are the same for nationals and immigrants (immigrants are legal). 
A worker has a probability p of becoming unemployed for exogenous reasons 
which do not depend on the employer.  All workers maximize present discounted 
                                                 
13 One could also imagine that migrants, when they arrive, do not consume leisure - they do not go to 
the cinema or have family meetings - thus their upper boundary of the effort devoted to work is higher.  10 
 
utility, with a rate of time preference r>0.  The model is set in continuous time.  The 
only choice that a worker makes is selection of effort    H L e e e ,  .  A worker, who 
does not shirk, performs at a customary level of effort for the job, eH, receives the 
wage w, and retains his or her job until he or she exogenously becomes unemployed.  
Employers imperfectly monitor effort.  Workers, who shirk   L e e , are detected and 
fired with probability per unit of time q.  Ve(s,j) and Ve(n,j) are expected lifetime 
utilities of an employed worker of type j (immigrant or local) when shirking (s) and 
when not (n).  Vu is the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed person
14.  For a 
shirker, 
    
        u e L e V j s V q p e w j s V r      , ,                     (2) 
And for a non-shirker, 
            u e H e V j n V p e w j n V r     , ,                                         (3) 
From (2) and (3): 
            
q p r





 ) , (               (4) 
and     
         
p r






H ) , ( .                                                    (5) 
 
No shirking takes place if and only if   ) , ( ) , ( j n V j s V e e  i.e.,  
 
         
H u L e
q
q p r
j V r e w 
 
                                             (6) 
Such that  L H H e e e    . 
Production functions are given by  ) , (
~
H H L L z L z L K f  .  K  is the available capital 
and  H H L L z L z L   is the amount of labor normalized by the effort exerted and the 





















 .  LL 
                                                 
14 The disutility, of immigrants of being unemployment, is not considered here. Usually migrants are  
unhappy being unemployed because they risk  expulsion,  the loss of legal residency permits etc. The 
introduction of the disutility of immigrant‟s unemployment status will only enhance the results. 11 
 
workers exert the minimum amount of effort  L e and LH workers exert the effort at the 
level of  H e .   The incomes of owners of capital (or employers) increase when the 
number of workers who are employed increase.
15  Demand for workers is given by the 
value  of  the  marginal  product,  and  is  a  d ecreasing  function  of  the  wage  w.  
Equilibrium is defined as an outcome when owners of capital, taking as given wages 
and employment levels at the other firms, find it optimal to offer the going wage 
rather than a different wage, that is, there is a Nash equilibrium in wages paid by 
employers.   
It is assumed that all workers receive the same wages.  i.e. we are considering 
a pooling equilibrium where all workers, local and migrants receive the same wages. 
Thus  the  sole  variable  determining  employers‟  decisions  is  the  disciplining  of 
employed workers through Vu, the expected utility of an unemployed worker. 
Since  all  unemployed  workers  receive  the  same  welfare  benefits  wo,  Vu  is 
common to all employees. An unemployed person‟s utility is thus independent of the 
identity of his or her previous employer.  Hence 
 
              j V j V k e w j rV u e j L u     0                               (8) 
 
where kj is the rate at which workers who are unemployed find jobs and Ve(j) is the 
expected utility of an employed worker of type j, which in equilibrium equals Ve(n,j).  
Substituting (8) into (4) and (5), we obtain  
  (9) 
             
r p k
p r e w k e w
j rV and
r p k
p e w r k e w
j rV
j j
j L o j H
u
j j
j L o j H
e  
   

 
   
  
 
Then, substituting (9) into (6), we determine that worker j will not shirk if   
 
        r p k
q
e
e w w j j
H
H o  

    .          (10) 
While  L H H e e e    . 
                                                 
15 Because of diminishing marginal product of labor. 12 
 
As we stated above we are concerned with a pooling equilibrium, thus the 
wages for the natives and for the local workers are identical.  Notice that while we are 
assuming the same wages migrants are identical and the same holds for the local 
population. Thus all workers in each group act in the same way: either invest high 
effort or low effort.  The condition in (8) specifies two different conditions, one for 
the local population (j=N ) and one for the immigrants (j=F). Thus the probability of 
losing a job and finding a job depends on the worker‟s status: local worker or migrant. 
In equilibrium the probability of finding a job will be  j k  which may differ for the two 
types of workers.  
 
4. The Dynamics of the Model. 
  We assume that both the local and the migrants earn the same income w. 
16 In 
industrialized countries wages are often determined by type of jobs and employers 
cannot  easily discriminate on the remuneration given to  workers. On the contrary 
workers are free to be more productive or less productive. Thus, in principal, there is 
no wage discrimination between locals and migrants. 
As assumed above real wages are thus defined as  w = wN /P. It is important to 
note  that  wages  in  equilibrium,  paid  by  the  employers,  are  in  nominal  terms.  
Moreover, to simplify matters we assume that prices in the host country are constant.  
The price level, which is used to normalize the wages, differs between the local and 
foreign workers.  Denote by PN the national price index and by PF the prices in the 
migrant‟s home country (to simplify we assume that there is only one type of migrant 
coming from the same original home
17 country and thus all discount  wages with the 
same price level).  Moreover, we consider migrants who come from a country with a 
lower price level than the host country.   
Immigrants, when entering the host country, have little or no knowledge of the 
host country and its cost of living.  Over time this information is revealed to the 
immigrant.
18 Many migrants send a lot of their income to their families as remittances.  
                                                 
16 If wages could differ between the local population and migrants, then the migrants would have a 
higher wage (a higher cost to be unemployed), however, the local populations' reservation wages would 
be higher than that of the migrants. Therefore, in equilibrium we would obtain that both groups would 
have more or less the same wages.  
17 If we would assume more than one country of origin the main results would not change. 
18 It may also be the case the speed and level of  information revealed  to the migrant is a function of the 
size of the network of the foreign local population from the same origin. 13 
 
Therefore, cost of living for the migrants, the price level at which they discount the 
nominal wages, will be the price level at their home country.  However, as the migrant 
stays longer in the host country, they will start adopting the life-style of the local 
population  and  obtain  more  information  regarding  the  cost  of  living  in  the  host 
country. Therefore, the older migrants (those with a longer tenure in the host country) 
put a higher weight on the local price index when making calculations regarding the 
real wages. The price level by which the migrant normalizes his wage is a function of 
3 parameters: the price level at the home country, the price level in the host country 
and the weight  assigned by the immigrants  to  each of the prices.   The weight  is 
therefore a function of the time the migrant has already spent in the host country and 
is given by the following function: 
 
              F N f P t P t P      1                                        (11) 
 
where    1 0   t   and      t   1  are respectively the weights assigned to the local 
price level and to the home country‟s price level. t denotes the length of time that the 






 and    1 ,   t t t 
. Namely, with time the migrant puts a larger weight on the local price level and a 
smaller one on the price at the home country
19. Moreover, it is assumed that if the 
migrant spends a sufficient amount of time in the host country , he/she will use the 
host country‟s price level only to normalize his wages
20.  We can conclude therefore 
that even though all migrants (and the local workers) earn the same nominal wages, 
                                                 
19 The migrants' decision on allowances has the same effect as described above. Migrants, as soon as 
they arrive in the destination country, remit a lot of their income to their home country, evaluating part 
of their income with respect to the price of the country of origin. The more they stay in the destination 
country the less they remit and the more they consume in the destination country. This myopic behavior 
is however adopted also by foreigners who do not remit. Italian engineers, going to Geneva (SW) in 
order to work at the CERN, have the same attitude regarding their wages. They evaluate it by Italian 
prices at the beginning and they work night and day. They do not send money home, but they feel that 
their wages are very high. The more they stay in destination country, and the more they have a normal 
life in the host country, the more they consider their wages in purchasing power terms to be not so high, 
and thus reduce their effort. 
20 Since we are analyzing migration of low skilled workers, we assume that the price level in the home 
country is lower than that of the host country: F N P P  .  Given (12) it is clear that over time the price 
level  that  the  migrant  uses  in  the  normalization  of  his  wages  approaches  that  of  the  host  country: 
N f P P  .  14 
 
the newly arrived migrants earn a different real wage than those who have arrived 
before them
21. 
One should note that the weight applied to the price level , in the country of 
origin and in the host economy , may be endogenous to the migration strategy and 
expected consumption patterns.  While the assumption made in the model , that the 
value placed on the country of origin‟s price level decreases, it may well be that it 
rather  depends  on  the  strategy  applied  (temporary,  permanent,  permanent  with 
remittances, etc). One may think that these values are constant within these groups 
but, in a world with a degree of uncertainty about time spent in the host country, more 
and more people realize that their intentions  are  more permanent  than temporary. 
Such a change of weight would not affect the results presented.  Moreover, the results 
presented in (10) are given for each migrant as a function of the time spent in the host 
country.  
 
5. Possible Equilibriums 
Let us now return to the equilibrium wage and to the level of effort exerted by the 
different workers.  
  As the price level at which the migrants discount their wages is lower than that 
of the local workers, the real wage received by the local workers is lower than that 
received by the migrants (and the real wages received by the newly migrants is higher 
than that of the migrants that arrived earlier). As the migrants stay longer in the host 
country, their real wages starts converging to the wages of the local population.  If the 
wages in equilibrium are set so that the local worker will exert a high level of effort, 
eH, then it is clear that the migrants will also exert a high level of effort.  However, if 
the wages are set in equilibrium so that the local workers exert a low level of effort, 
eL, then it may well be the case that the migrants will exert a high level of effort.  
  Assume that in the absence of foreign workers the wage is set such that the 
local workers exert a high level of effort.  Denote the number of workers employed in 
equilibrium as LN
0 .  The profits of the capital owners will thus be: 
   
                                                 
21 However two migrants with the same time duration, the first with the family at home and the second 
reunified by the family could make a different effort.   15 
 
   
0 0 0 0
~
0 ) , ( w L C P z L K f L N x N N                                (12) 
 
where  K  is  the  capital  level,  total  output is  given  by  ) , (
~
Lz K f ,  the  price  of  the 
product by 
0
x P equilibrium wage 
0 w and total cost of production   
0 0 w L C N . 
  When migrants enter the country, the equilibrium wage level will change as a 
result of the changes in the individuals willing to work (and as a result the price level 
of the products will also change). Thus the wage, which will encourage a high level of 
effort from the local population, will decrease (see Epstein and Hillman, 2003).  
Therefore, if the firms continue to pay wages  which will stimulate a high level of 
effort from the local population, then  the migrants will also exert a high level of 
effort.  
 
5.1 Fixed and equal human capital 
In this section we assume that human capital is equal and fixed for all the workers.  So 
we can concentrate on the worker's productivity as a function their effort. 
Now  let  us  consider  three  different  equilibriums  with  both  native  workers  and 
migrants:  a. both the migrants and the native population are exerting a high level of 
effort, b. the native population is exerting a low level while the migrants are exerting a 
high level and c. all workers are exerting a low level of effort: 
 
Case 1a: wages are set at w
1, both the local and migrants exert a high level of effort, 
          
1 1 1 0 1 1
~
1 1 ) , ( , w L L C P e L L K f L L N F x H F N F N                     (13) 
 
Case 1b: wages are set at w
2, the local population exerts a low level of effort, eL and 
the migrants exert a high level, eH,  
             
2 2 2 0 2 2
~
2 2 ) , ( , w L L C P e L e L K f L L N F x H F L N F N                     (14) 
 
Case 1c: wages are set at w
3, both the local and migrants exert a low level of effort, 
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       
3 3 3 0 3 3
~
3 3 ) , ( , w L L C P e L L K f L L N F x L F N F N                     (15) 
 
where 
3 2 1 0 w w w w    and,  of  course,  the  number  of  workers  employed  in 
equilibrium in all three cases are not identical.  All three equilibriums are possible.  
We  wish  to  consider  the  second  case  where  wages  have  dropped  as  a  result  of 
migration, and in equilibrium, the level of effort of the foreign population is higher 
than that of the local population.  As assumed above, all workers receive the same 
nominal wages. Therefore, the local population receives, in real terms, a lower wage 
than the migrants.  However, the employer receives a higher level of effort at the same 
nominal wage level.  It is obvious that case b may well be an equilibrium outcome.  
However, we must note that the profits of the firm and the level of exertion is a 
function of time.   
 
5.1.1  A fully inelastic supply of immigrants  
Assume that the number of migrants is fixed in the economy, then over time case b 
will  converge  into  case  a  or  case  c:     
2 2 , F N L L   
1 1 , F N L L    or   
2 2 , F N L L    
 
3 3 , F N L L  .  Namely, it is not clear whether the migrants are increasing the average 
level of effort  exerted or decreasing it.  The reason for this is  that over time the 
migrants' real wages converge on that of the native population.  As the real wages 
converge, the level of efforts extracted by the workers also converge as well as their 
productivity.  At the same time the labor force has increased, the wages have dropped 
and thus the wages may drop to a level such that both groups exert a high or low level 
of effort.      
   
We conclude therefore that, 
Migrants may well exert a higher level of effort than the local population.  However, 
with time, the level of effort exerted by the migrants and the local population will 
converge.    
 
Notice that the effort exerted by the worker is a function of the unemployment level. 
If we consider, in addition, that migrants do not know, on their arrival, the level of 17 
 
employment and unemployment, and that over time this knowledge is revealed to 
them, then this new knowledge will affect their effort invested at the work place.
22  
Their efforts will converge over time  and become equal to that of a local worker.  
Thus, if we incorporate, directly into the model above, this lack of information about 
the unemployment level, it would only enhance the results presented above.  
  
5.1.2 Constant inflow of immigrants. 
As a direct result, the longer the migrants are in the host country the more they appear 
like  the  local  population.    Therefore,  over  time,  the  employers  will  employ  the 
newcomers instead of the old migrants and the local population.  The rate at which the 
hiring and firing occurs will depend on the costs and on the rate at which the effort of 
the migrants change over time
23. 
 
5.2 Heterogenous human capital 
Let us consider the case where human capital  is an important component of total 
workers productivity.  Assume that immigrants and the local population have only 
two types of human capital High, h H , and Low, h L. The total productivity can thus be 
written  as  follows:    e h z , and  the  production  function  can  be  written  as  follows: 
    e h z L K f , ,
~
.  We assume therefore that human capital and effort exerted at the 
workplace can be substitutes.  Namely if a worker with low human capital increases 
his effort at the workplace he will be identical to a worker with high human capital 
with low exerted effort.  Let us consider the following cases: 
     
                                                 
22 The information level can also be a function of the size of the existing network at the time of arrival 
of the migrants into the host country.  The reason for this is that as the size of the network increases the 
new migrant may receive more information and adapt more easily  to the local population. 
23 Low exertion of effort, if not accompanied by a return home, will increase the  unemployment rate 
among immigrants staying a long  period of time in the host country. Looking at the data  on first and 
second generation migrants there is evidence of this correlation.   In France in 1993 the unemployment 
rate among natives was 10% while among foreigners it was 20.6%; moreover, the unempl oyment rate 
among the natives aged under 25 years old was 25.2% while among foreigners of the same age it was 
32.3%. In the Netherlands in the same period of time, the unemployment rate was 5.7% among  natives 
and 19.6% among foreigners, and respectively 9.8% and 25% among young natives and foreigners. In 
Germany the unemployment rate was 4.9% and 12.7% for all natives and foreigners, whilst for the 
population aged under 25 it was 4.8% and 14.1% respectively (see, Böhning 1995).  18 
 
a. Natives and foreigners have the same level of productivity,    e h z , .   As described 
above, the migrants' real wages decrease over time and as a result the workers may 
exert less effort at the workplace. If the migrants exert less effort then this will not be 
compensated by an increase in human capital as the employers will fire the foreigners 
and employ recently arrived migrants or the local population.  
 
b. If the human capital of the foreigners and  natives are equal to each other and at a 
low level, and at the same time, the effort invested by the foreigners is higher than 
that  of  the  local  population:  en L <ef H ,,  then  foreigners  productivity  level  will  be 
higher than that of the local population:      e h z e h z n f , ,  .  In this case the employer 
will prefer to hire foreigners in the first period. If in the second period the effort of the 
foreigners declines without any increase in human capital, then the employer will be 
indifferent as to employing natives  or second period foreigners, but he will prefer 
first period immigrants.  If on the other hand, the human capital of the foreigners 
increase over time, while the effort of others is reduced such that it compensates for 
the reduction in exerted effort, then the employers will also prefer foreigners in the 
second period.  
 
6.  The Local workers and the employers 
As defined above the utility of the workers is given by 
 
C C U  ) (  
                                                s.t.                                                                            (16)                                                                                                                                                                  
                                                        N w e T P    
                                                        e T P C    
 
Total consumption of the workers is a function of the level of effort exerted by the 
workers. e,   
  Denote  the  aggregate  demand  as    P e e D n f , , , , namely the demand for the 
products is a function of the effort exerted by the different groups and the price of the 
products. Moreover, as the levels of exerted effort increase the demand for the 
products decreases. Let us denote th e supply by   P z z S f n , , , namely the supply is a 19 
 
function of the productivity levels of the different groups and the price level (which in 
equilibrium is a function of the wage level). It is clear that as the level of productivity 
increases the supply increases.   
We  now  consider  the  effect,  which  changes  in  the  effort  exerted  by  the 
different  groups,  has  on  the  equilibrium,  quantity  and  prices.  In  equilibrium,  the 
quantity  demanded  equals  the  quantity  supplied.  Let  us  consider  the  following 
situation under which both the local and the migrant workers exert the same effort:  
z z z and e e e l n l n     .   In this case    P e e D , , ,   =    P z z S , ,  and we obtain 
that the quantities and prices in equilibrium equal: 
 
                 








b q  and 
j
b p  are the quantities and the prices group j = n , l in equilibrium.   
* *
b b p and q denote the total quantity and price at equilibrium. 
 
Case  1:  Both  the  local  population  and  the  migrants  have  the  same  level  of 
productivity  while  the  migrants  invest  more  effort  than  the  local  population:  
z z z and e e l n f n   
1 .  As a result of migration denote the new quantities and 
prices as  
j q1  and 
j p1  In this case we would obtain that    














q q q q q q

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                                (18) 
 
As the immigrants spend more effort at the workplace we can see from (16) that the 
immigrants will have a lower consumption level.  This will decrease the total demand 
for products, which will, in turn, decrease the price of the products.  As the price level 
decreases, the demand of the local population will increase.  
 20 
 
Case 2: Now let us take this one step further.  Let us assume that the above analysis is 
true for second year immigrants.  Here the employers decide to replace the second 
year  immigrants  with  those  newly  arrived.    In  this  case  we  will  obtain: 
2
2 1 z z and e e e n f f n     .  The supply will increase as the employers have more 
efficient  workers.    As  the  newly  arrived  immigrants  exert  more  effort  at  the 
workplace, the demand for the them will decrease relative to that of the second year 
immigrants.  At the same time the demand for the local population will increase as the 
price level has increased and therefore the real wage increased.   
 
The local workers benefits:  The local workers are better off, their real wages have 
increased as has their consumption.  It is true that maybe some of them are worse off 
as they have been replaced by newly arrived migrants, however, this is not clear as 
the decrease in prices has increased the quantity demanded.   The unemployed are 
also better off as their real unemployment benefits have increased.  
 
The capital owners' benefit:  Each firm sees as given the wages and the price level 
and it is assumed that each firm is small and has no market power.  Thus, the capital 
owners benefit from replacing an “older” migrant with a “newly” arrived one.  
  
The  reason  for  this  result  is  that  the  employer  will  receive  a  better  worker,  who 
extracts more effort in the workplace and earns the same wage as the “older” migrant. 
At  the  firm  level  the  price  of  the  product  is  given  and  thus  his  profits  increase.  
However, in equilibrium it is not clear if the firms‟ profit increases or decreases, as 
real wages increase and production increases. It is clear that for each firm it is optimal 
to replace its “older” migrant with the newly arrived migrant. 
    
 
7. Concluding Remarks and Policy implications: 
In this paper we have provided a rationale for the newly-arrived legal migrants to 
exert more effort than the local population.
24 Moreover, new migrants exert more 
                                                 
24 Our model considers only legal immigration. With regard to illegal immigration, see for example 
Djajić (1997).  For a perspective on efficiency wages with illegal immigration in a dual labor market 
model, see Carter (1999). 21 
 
effort that the "older" ones and invest a higher level of effort, but over time, the level 
of effort exerted by the local population and the migrants converge. 
Fundamentally,  if  immigrants  have  the  same  human  capital  as  the  natives, 
firms prefer new immigrants to “older” immigrants, and if they are able to fire “older” 
immigrants and employ new ones they will do so. This implies that employers will 
always prefer newly-arrived migrants.
 25 On the other hand, as shown above, the local 
population may also benefits from newly-arrived migrants. However, both the local 
population and the employers gain disutility from migrants who stay too long in the 
host country. The policy that will achieve this situation will be to limit the time the 
migrants  can  stay  in  the  host  country  and  replace  migrants  with  newly  arriving 
migrants.  This policy is a temporary migration policy. 
Such a temporary migration policy will benefit both the employers and the 
workers. Under this policy, migrants will enter the host country for a given period of 
time. At the end of the period the migrants will return to their home country. If the 
host country still needs migrant workers, the old workers will be replaced by the 
newly arrived migrants exerting a high level of effort. 
The rational for a temporary migration policy derives not from the welfare 
costs, nor from social or labor market competition, but from the profit maximization 
choice of the employer and the benefit to the final consumer. The same rationale 
applies  to  the  more  recent  circular  migration  policy  in  which  the  repetition  of 
temporary migration spells with the consumption focused in the origin country could 
reproduce the effort and the productivity behavior described above. 
The question is how such a policy can be implemented? The way to implement 
such a policy is to create a contracted temporary migrant policy, which limits the 
period of time that the migrants can stay in the host country. When migrants leave the 
host country, new migrants will enter, and these will exert a high level of effort in the 
workplace.  
Theoretically, one new migrant should enter every day and one should leave. 
However, training migrants and teaching them the new jobs entail costs.  Moreover, 
also to be considered are the transportation costs, which may well fall on the capital 
                                                 
25 If the migrant invests in the specific human capital of the country of destination, his productivity 
increases and thus counteracts the decline of his productivity imputed to the reduction of effort. The 
final result is not clear: the two forces can be of different strength. However many jobs filled by 
migrants do not need any human capital investment and there is no increase in productivity.  22 
 
owners. Thus, the policy should also take account of the costs of changing migrants 
and  calculate  the  optimal  time  that  a  migrant  should  stay  in  the  host  county. 
Temporary contracted migration has many problems; the main one is ensuring that 
legal migrants will leave the host country on the conclusion of their contracts. There 
are many ways to ensure that they do so (see Epstein, Hillman and Weiss (1999) and 
chapter 7 in Boeri, Gordon and McCormick (2002)). Temporary migration may well 
benefit the sending country because the temporary migrants are likely to increase their 
human capital in the host country and thus return to the home country with greater 
human capital.
26  
Note that the capital owners will benefit from migration. Their level of benefit 
will be a function of the length of the contract. On the other hand, however, the native 
labor force, which will be unemployed as a result of such a policy, will be harmed. 
Yet  the  native  population,  or  better  the  native  consumers  (which  include  the 
unemployed) will prefer to have a large turnover of migrants with a higher effort and 
lower consumption.  
        The favorable sentiment of capital owners and the local population towards 
migrants may arise when temporary migration policies are adopted. If such policies 
are adopted, the level of effort extracted from migrants is optimized, prices decrease, 
real wages increase, and welfare grows. 
                                                 
26  See  also  the  economic  case  for  broad  benefits  from  immigration  based  on  the  human-capital 
upgrading  of  domestic  unskilled  labor  made  by  Schmidt,  Stilz,  and  Zimmermann  (1994)  and  the 
positive effect of  reducing child labor in the host country see Epstein and Kahana (2008).. 23 
 
References 
Arad, R.W. and Hillman, A.L.  (1979)  The collective good motive for immigration 
policy.  Australian Economic Papers 18: 243-257. 
Barrett A., McCarthy Y. (2008) Immigration and Welfare Programmes: Exploring the 
Interactions between Immigrant Characteristics, Immigrant Welfare Dependence 
and Welfare Policy, Oxford Review Economic Policy, 24(3), 542-559. 
Bauer  T.,  Sinning  M.,(2005)  The  saving  behaviour  of  Temporary  and  Permanent 
Migrants in Germany, IZA D.P. 1632 
Benhabib, J. (1996)  On the political economy of immigration.  European Economic 
Review 40: 1737-1743. 
Boeri, T., Hanson G. and McCormick, B. (2002) Immigration Policy and the Welfare 
System, Oxford University Press. 
Böhning R.W., (1995) Labour Market Integration in Western and Northern Europe. 
Which way are we heading?, in Böhning R.W., Zegers de Beijl R., 1995, The 
Integration of Migrant Workers in the Labour Market: Policies and their Impact, 
I.L.O. Employment Department, International Migration Papers, n. 8 
Bonin, H., Raffelhüschen B., and Walliser, J.  (2000)  Can immigrants alleviate the 
demographic burden? An assessment with generational accounting. Finanzarchiv, 
57: 1-21   
Borjas G. (1994) The Economics of Immigration, Journal of Economic Literature, 32: 
1667-717. 
Borjas  G.,  (1999)  Immigration  and  the  Welfare  Magnets,  Journal  of  Labour 
Economics, vol,.17, n.4, part1:607-637 
Borjas G. (2003) The Labour Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the 
Impact of Immigration in the Labour Market, Quarterly Journal of Economics,118: 
1335-74. 
Buchanan, J. M., (1975)  The Samaritan‟s dilemma.  In Edmund Phelps, ed., Altruism, 
Morality and Economic Theory, Russell Sage, New York: 71-85.  
Carling  J.  2008,  The  Determinants  of  Migrant  Remittances,  Oxford  Review  of 
Economic Policy, vol.24-3, pp.582-599. 
Card  D., (2005) Is the New Immigration Really So Bad? Economic Journal, 115, 
F300-F323. 
Carter, T. J.  (1999)  Illegal immigration in an efficiency wage model. Journal of 
International Economics 49: 385-401.   
Castronova E., Kayser H., Frick J., Wagner G. (2001) Immigrants, Natives and Social 
assistance: Comparative Take-up under Comparable Circumstances, International 
Migration Review, vol.35,(3):726-748.  
Cortes  KE,  2004,  Are  Refugees  Different  from  Economic  Immigrants?  Some 
Empirical  Evidence  on  the  Heterogeneity  of  immigrant  Groups  in  the  United 
States, Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(2) 465-480 . 
De Giorgi G., Pellizzari M. (2006) Welfare Migration in Europe and the Cost of a 
Harmonised Social Assistance, IZA D.P.2094 
Djajić, S. (1997) Illegal immigrants and resource allocation. International Economic 
Review 38: 97-117. 
Dustamann C. and Fabbri F.  (2005) Immigrants in the British Labour Market, Fiscal 
Studies, 26 (4): 423-470. 
Dustmann    C.  and  Weiss  Y.  (2007)  Return  Migration:  Theory  and  Empirical 
Evidence, CREAM Discussion paper series n.2/07. 24 
 
Epstein, G. S., Hillman, A. L.  (2003) Unemployed Immigrants and Voter Sentiment 
in the Welfare State, Journal of Public Economics: 1641-1655. 
Epstein, G.S., Hillman A.L. and Weiss A. (1999) Creating Illegal Immigrants, Journal 
of Population Economics, 12(1): 3-21. 
Epstein,  G.S.  and  Kahana,  N.  (2008)  Child  Labor  and  Temporary  Emigration 
Economics Letters 99(3), 545-548. 
Epstein  G.S.,  Nitzan  S.  (2006)  The  Struggle  over  Migration  Policy,  Journal  of 
Population Economics, 19(4): 703-723.  
European  Commission,  (2007)  On  Circular  Migration  and  Mobility  Partnership 
between the European Union and Third Countries, COM(2007), final Bruxelles, 16 
May. 
Filer R.  (1992) The Effect of Immigrant Arrival on Migratory Patterns of Native 
Workers,  in  Borjas  G.J.,  Freeman  R.  (eds)  Immigration  and  the  Work  Force, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Fuest, C. and Thum, M. (2001)  Immigration and skill formation in unionized labour 
markets.  European Journal of Political Economy, 18. 
Funhouser  E:,  (1995),  Remittances  from  International  Migration,  The  Review  of 
Economic and Statistsics, vol.77.1, pp.137-146. 
Galor O., Stark O., (1990), Migrants‟ Savings, the Probability of Return Migration 
and Migrants‟ Perfomance, International Economic Review, vol.31-2, pp.463-467. 
Galor O., Stark O., (1991), The probability of return migration, migrants‟ work effort, 
and migrants‟ performance. Journal of Development Economics 35(2): 399 – 405. 
Gans,  H. (1979) Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in 
America, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2(1): 1-20. 
Gans, H. (1996) Second-Generation Decline. Scenarios for the Economic and Ethnic 
Futures of the post-1965 American immigrants, in Immigration and Integration in 
Post-Industrial  Societies.  Theorical  analysis  and  policy-related  research,  ed 
Carmon N. 65-85. Basingstoke:Macmillan,  
Glazer,  N.,  Moynihan  D.  (1970)  Beyond  The  Melting  Pot,  Mass.  MIT  Press,  , 
Cambridge. 
Kahanec  M.,  Shields  M.,  2010,  The  Working  Hours  of  Immigrants  in  Germany: 
Temporary versus permanent, IZA DP 4735. 
Holst  E:,  Schäfer  A.,  Schrooten  M.,  2010,  Gender,  Transnational  Networks  and 
Remittances: Evidence from Germany, SOEP paper 296. 
Kirdar    G.M.,  2008,  Labor  Market  Outcomes,  Savings  Accumulation,  and  Return 
Migration, Labour Economics, 16(4) 418-428. 
Kirdar    G.M.,  2009,  Source  Country  Characteristics  and  Immigrants‟  Migrant 
Duration and Saving Decisions, MPRA paper. N 13322. 
Kumku E.M., 1989, The Saving Behaviour of Migrant Workers: Turkish Workers in 
W. Germany, Journal of Development Economics, 30, 273-286. 
Hansen J., Lofstrom M. (2003) Immigrants assimilation and Welfare Participation: Do 
Immigrants Assimilate into or out of Welfare? Journal of Human Resources, 38, 
n.1: 74-98. 
Hillman, A. L. and Weiss, A. (1999)  A theory of permissible illegal immigration. 
European Journal of Political Economy 15: 585-604. 
Hillman, A. L.  (2002)  Immigration and intergenerational transfers, in H. Siebert, ed., 
Economic Policy For Aging Societies, Springer, Berlin. 
Lee, R. D. and Miller, T. W. (1998)  The current fiscal impact of immigration and 
their  descendants:  beyond  the  immigrant  household.    In  J.P.  Smith  and  B. 25 
 
Edmonston, The Immigration Debate, National Academy Press: Washington, DC: 
183-205. 
Lonzano F.A., 2010, Understanding the workweek of foreigner born workers in the 
United States, Review Economic Household, 8, 83-104. 
Mansoor A., Quillin B., 2006, Migration and Remittances, Eastern Europe and the 
Former Soviet Union, The World Bank. 
Mazza,  I.  and  van  Winden,  F.W.  (1996)  A  political  economy  analysis  of  labor 
migration and income distribution.  Public Choice 88: 333-363. 
Newland K., Dovelyn A. (2007) How can circular migration and sustainable return 
serve as development tools? , background paper for the first meeting of the Global 
Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), Bruxelles, 9-11 July 2007. 
Ottaviano  G.M.,  Peri  G.  (2006)  Rethinking  the  effects  of  immigration  on  wages, 
NBER Working Paper No. W12497. 
Pellizzari M., 2011, The use of Welfare of migrants in Italy, mimeo. 
Picha M. Zhu Y., 2007, Precautionary saving by Natives and Immigrants in Germany, 
IZA DP.2942. 
Poirine B., (1997) A Theory of Remittances as an Implicit Family Loan Arrangement, 
World Development, vol.25-4, pp.589-611. 
Portes A., Zou M. (1993) The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and 
its Variants Among Post-1965 Immigrant Youth,  The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Sciences 530:74-96. 
Riphan R. (2004), Immigration Participation in Social Assistance Programs, Applied 
Economics Quarterly, 50 (4): 329-362. 
Reyneri E., 2011,Preliminari results on the hours worked by migrants, mimeo. 
Schaeffer  P.V.,  1995,  The  Work  effort  and  the  Consumption  of  Immigrants  as  a 
Function  of  Their  Assimilation,  International  Economic  Review,  vol.36,  n.3, 
pp.625-642. 
Schmidt, Christophe M., Stilz, Anette, and Zimmermann, Klaus F.  (1994)  Mass 
migration, unions, and government intervention.  Journal of Public Economics, 55: 
185-201. 
Sinn, Hans-Werner (995)  A theory of the welfare state.  Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics 97: 495-526. 
Shapiro, C. and Stiglitz, J. (1984) Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline 
device.  American Economic Review 74: 433-44. 
Speciale  B.,  Barigozzi  M.,  2009,  Immigrant‟s  legal  Status,  Permanence  in  the 
Destination Country and the Distribution of Consumption Expenditure, ECARES 
WP 2009-019. 
Storesletten,  K.  (2000)  Sustaining  fiscal  policy  though  immigration.    Journal  of 
Political Economy, 108: 300-323. 
Venturini A. (1997)  L'offerta  differenziale dello straniero, Economia Politica, n.2, 
annoXIV: 257-282. 
Venturini  A.  (2004),  Post  War  Migration  in  Southern  Europe,  An  Economic 
Approach, CUP, Cambridge Mass. 
Venturini A. (2008) Circular Migration as an employment strategy for Mediterranean  
countries, CARIM/RSCAS  ASN n.39 
Venturini A., Villosio C.  (2008), Assimilation of migrants  in  recent immigration 
countries: The Italian Experience, OXREP, vol.23, 4, 518-542. 
Wong,  Kar-yiu,  1995.    International  Trade  in  Goods  and  Factor  Mobility.    MIT 
Press, Cambridge. 
 